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Abstract
Prediction is a well-studied machine learning task, and prediction algorithms are
core ingredients in online products and services. Despite their centrality in the
competition between online companies who offer prediction-based products, the
strategic use of prediction algorithms remains unexplored. The goal of this pa-
per is to examine strategic use of prediction algorithms. We introduce a novel
game-theoretic setting that is based on the PAC learning framework, where each
player (aka a prediction algorithm at competition) seeks to maximize the sum of
points for which it produces an accurate prediction and the others do not. We
show that algorithms aiming at generalization may wittingly miss-predict some
points to perform better than others on expectation. We analyze the empirical
game, i.e. the game induced on a given sample, prove that it always possesses
a pure Nash equilibrium, and show that every better-response learning process
converges. Moreover, our learning-theoretic analysis suggests that players can,
with high probability, learn an approximate pure Nash equilibrium for the whole
population using a small number of samples.
1 Introduction
Prediction plays an important role in twenty-first century economics. An important example is the
way online retailers advertise services and products tailored to predict individual taste. Companies
collect massive amounts of data and employ sophisticated machine learning algorithms to discover
patterns and seek connections between different user groups. A company can offer customized prod-
ucts, relying on user properties and past interactions, to outperform the one-size-fits-all approach.
For instance, after examining sufficient number of users and the articles they read, media websites
promote future articles predicted as having a high probability of satisfying a particular user.
For revenue-seeking companies, prediction is another tool that can be exploited to increase revenue.
When companies’ products are alike, the chance that a user will select the product of a particular
company decreases. In this case a company may purposely avoid offering the user this product and
offer an alternative one in order to maximize the chances of having its product selected. Despite the
intuitive clarity of the tradeoff above and the enormous amount of work done on prediction in the
machine learning and statistical learning communities, far too little attention has been paid to the
study of prediction in the context of competition.
In this paper we introduce what is, to the best of our knowledge, a first-ever attempt to study how the
selection of prediction algorithms is affected by strategic behavior in a competitive setting, using a
game-theoretic lens. We consider a space of users, where each user is modeled as a triplet (x, y, t) of
an instance, a label and a threshold, respectively. A user’s instance is a real vector that encodes his1
properties; the label is associated with his taste, and the threshold is the “distance” he is willing to
accept between a proposed product and his taste. Namely, the user associated with (x, y, t) embraces
a customized product f(x) if f(x) − y is less than or equal to t. In such a case, the user is satisfied
and willing to adopt the product. If a user is satisfied with several products (of several companies),
he selects one uniformly at random. Indeed, the user-model we adopt is aligned with the celebrated
“Satisficing" principle of Simon [18], and other widely-accepted models in the literature on choice
prediction, e.g. the model of selection based on small samples [3, 7]. Several players are equipped
with infinite strategy spaces, or hypothesis classes in learning-theoretic terminology. A player’s
strategy space models the possible predictive functions she can employ. Players are competing for
the users, and a player’s payoff is the expected number of users who select her offer. To model
uncertainty w.r.t. the users’ taste, we use the PAC-learning framework of Valiant [19]. We assume
user distribution is unknown, but the players have access to a sequence of examples, containing
instances, labels and thresholds, with which they should optimize their payoffs w.r.t. the unknown
underlying user distribution.
From a machine learning perspective we now face the challenge of what would be a good prediction
algorithm profile, i.e. a set of algorithms for the players such that no player would deviate from her
algorithm assuming the others all stick to their algorithms. Indeed, such a profile of algorithms deter-
mines a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) of prediction algorithms, a powerful solution concept which
rarely exists in games. An important question in this regard is whether such a profile exists. An ac-
companying question is whether a learning dynamics in which players may change their prediction
algorithms to better-respond to others would converge. Therefore, we ask:
● Does a PNE exist?●Will the players be able to find it efficiently with high probability using a better-response dynam-
ics?
We prove that the answer to both questions is yes. We first show that when the capacity of each
strategy space is bounded (i.e., finite pseudo-dimension), players can learn payoffs from samples.
Namely, we show that the payoff function of each player uniformly converges over all possible
strategy profiles (that include strategies of the other players). Thus with high probability a player’s
payoff under any strategy profile is not too distant from her empirical payoff. Later, we show that an
empirical PNE always exists, i.e., a PNE of the game induced on the empirical sample distribution.
Moreover, we show that any learning dynamics in which players improve their payoff by more than
a non-negligible quantity converges fast to an approximate PNE. Using the two latter results, we
show an interesting property of the setting: the elementary idea of sampling and better-responding
according to the empirical distribution until convergence leads to an approximate PNE of the game
on the whole population. We analyze this learning process, and formalize the above intuition via
an algorithm that runs in polynomial time in the instance parameters, and returns an approximate
PNE with high probability. Finally, we discuss the case of infinite capacities, and demonstrate that
non-learnability can occur even if the user distribution is known to all players.
Related work The intersection of game theory and machine learning has increased rapidly in re-
cent years. Sample empowered mechanism design [16] is a fruitful line of research. For example,
[6, 8, 14] reconsider auctions where the auctioneer can sample from bidder valuation functions,
thereby relaxing the assumption of prior knowledge on bidder valuation distribution [15]. Empirical
distributions also play a key role in other lines of research [1, 2, 11], where e.g. [2] show how to ob-
tain an approximate equilibrium by sampling any mixed equilibrium. The PAC-learning framework
proposed by Valiant [19] has also been extended by Blum et al. [5], who consider a collaborative
game where players attempt to learn the same underlying prediction function, but each player has
her own distribution over the space. In their work each player can sample from her own distribution,
and the goal is to use information sharing among the players to reduce the sample complexity.
Our work is inspired by Dueling Algorithms [10]. Immorlica et al. analyze an optimization problem
from the perspective of competition, rather than from the point of view of a single optimizer. Our
1For ease of exposition, third-person singular pronouns are “he” for a user and “she” for a player.
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model is also related to Competing Bandits [12]. Mansour et al. consider a competition between two
bandit algorithms faced with the same sample, where users arrive one by one and choose between the
two algorithms. In our work players also share the same sample, but we consider an offline setting
and not an online one; infinite strategy spaces and not a finite set of actions; context in the form of
property vector for each user; and an arbitrary number of asymmetric players, where asymmetry is
reflected in the strategy space of each player.
Most relevant to our work is [4]. The authors present a learning task where a newcomer agent is
given a sequence of examples, and wishes to learn a best-response to the players already on the
market. They assume that the agent can sample triplets composed of instance, label and current mar-
ket prediction, and define the agent’s payoff as the proportion of points (associated with users) she
predicts better than the other players. Indeed, [4] introduces a learning task incorporating economic
interpretation into the objective function of the (single) optimizer, but in fact does not provide any
game-theoretic analysis. In comparison, this paper considers game-theoretic interaction between
players, and its main contribution lies in the analysis of such interactions. Since learning dynam-
ics consists of steps of unilateral deviations that improve the deviating player’s payoff, the Best
Response Regression of Ben-Porat and Tennenholtz[4] can be thought of as an initial step to this
work.
Our contribution Our contribution is three-fold. First, we explicitly suggest that prediction algo-
rithms, like other products on the market, are in competition. This novel view emphasizes the need
for stability in prediction-based competition similar to Hotelling’s stability in spatial competition
[9].
Second, we introduce an extension of the PAC-learning framework for dealing with strategy profiles,
each of which is a sequence of functions. We show a reduction from payoff maximization to loss
minimization, which is later used to achieve bounds on the sample complexity for uniform conver-
gence over the set of profiles. We also show that when players have approximate better-response
oracles, they can learn an approximate PNE of the empirical game. The main technical contribution
of this paper is an algorithm which, given ǫ, δ, samples a polynomial number of points in the game
instance parameters, runs any ǫ-better-response dynamics, and returns an ǫ-PNE with probability of
at least 1 − δ.
Third, we consider games with at least one player with infinite pseudo-dimension. We show a game
instance where each player can learn the best prediction function from her hypothesis class if she
were alone in the game, but a PNE of the empirical game is not generalized. This inability to
learn emphasizes that strategic behavior can introduce further challenges to the machine learning
community.
2 Problem definition
In this section we formalize the model. We begin with an informal introduction to elementary
concepts in both game theory and learning theory that are used throughout the paper.
Game theory A non-cooperative game is composed of a set of playersN = {1, . . .N}; a strategy
spaceHi for every player i; and a payoff function πi ∶ H1 ×⋯×HN → R for every player i. The setH = H1 ×⋯×HN contains of all possible strategies, and a tuple of strategies h = (h1, . . . hN) ∈ H
is called a strategy profile, or simply a profile. We denote by h−i the vector obtained by omitting the
i-th component of h.
A strategy h′i ∈ Hi is called a better response of player i with respect to a strategy profile h if
πi(h′i,h−i) > πi(h). Similarly, h′i is said to be an ǫ-better response of player i w.r.t. a strategy
profile h if πi(h′i,h−i) ≥ πi(h)+ǫ, and a best response to h−i if πi(h′i,h−i) ≥ suphi∈Hi πi(hi,h−i)
.
We say that a strategy profile h is a pure Nash equilibrium (herein denoted PNE) if every player
plays a best response under h. We say that a strategy profile h is an ǫ-PNE if no player has an
ǫ-better response under h, i.e. for every player i it holds that πi(h) ≥ suph′
i
∈Hi
πi(h′i,h−i) − ǫ.
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Learning theory Let F be a class of binary-valued functions F ⊆ {0,1}X . Given a sequence S =(x1, . . . xm) ∈ Xm, we denote the restriction of F to S by F ∩ S = {(f(x1), . . . , f(xm)) ∣ f ∈ F}.
The growth function of F , denoted ΠF ∶ N → N, is defined as ΠF (m) = maxS∈Xm ∣F ∩ S ∣. We
say that F shatters S if ∣F ∩ S ∣ = 2∣S ∣. The Vapnik-Chervonenkis dimension of a binary function
class is the cardinality of the largest set of points in X that can be shattered by F , VCdim(F ) =
max{m ∈ N ∶ ΠF (m) = 2m}.
Let H be a class of real-valued functions H ⊆ RX . The restriction of H to S ∈ Xm is analogously
defined, H ∩ S = {(h(x1), . . . , h(xm)) ∣ h ∈ H}. We say that H pseudo-shatters S if there exists
r = (r1, . . . , rm) ∈ Rm such that for every binary vector b = (b1, . . . bm) ∈ {−1,1}m there exists
hb ∈ H and for every i ∈ [m] it holds that sign(hb(xi) − ri) = bi. The pseudo-dimension of H is
the cardinality of the largest set of points in X that can be pseudo-shattered byH ,
Pdim(H) =max{m ∈ N ∶ ∃S ∈ Xm such that S is pseudo-shattered byH} .
2.1 Model
We consider a set of users who are interested in a product provided by a set of competing players.
Each user is associated with a vector (x, y, t), where x is the instance; y is the label; and t is the
threshold that the user is willing to accept.
The players offer customized products to the users. When a user associated with a vector (x, y, t)
approaches player i, she produces a prediction hi(x). If ∣hi(x) − y∣ is at most t, the user associated
with (x, y, t)will grant one monetary unit to player i. Alternatively, that user will move on to another
player. We assume that users approach players according to the uniform distribution, although our
model and results support any distribution over player orderings. Player i has a set of possible
strategies (prediction algorithms) Hi, from which she has to decide which one to use. Each player
aims to maximize her expected payoff, and will act strategically to do so.
Formally, the game is a tuple ⟨Z ,D,N , (Hi)i∈N ⟩ such that
1. Z is the examples domain Z = X × Y × T , where X ⊂ Rn is the instance domain; Y ⊂ R
is the label domain; and T ⊂ R≥0 is the tolerance domain.
2. D is a probability distribution over Z = X × Y × T .
3. N is the set of players, with ∣N ∣ = N . A strategy of player i is an element fromHi ⊆ YX .
The space of all strategy profiles is denoted byH = ⨉Ni=1Hi.
4. For z = (x, y, t) and a function g ∶ X → Y , we define the indicator I(z, g) to be 1 if the
distance between the value g predicted for x and y is at most t. Formally,
I(z, g) = {1 ∣g(x) − y∣ ≤ t
0 otherwise
.
5. Given a strategy profile h = (h1, . . . hN) with hi ∈ Hi for i ∈ {1, . . .N} and z = (x, y, t) ∈Z , let
wi(z;h) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
0 if I(z, hi) = 0
1
∑N
i′=1
I(z,h
i′
)
otherwise
.
Note that wi(z;h) represents the expected payoff of player i w.r.t. the user associated with
z. The payoff of player i under h is the average sum over all users, and is defined by
πi(h) = Ez∼D [wi(z;h)] .
6. D is unknown to the players.
We assume players have access to a sequence of examples S. Given a game instance⟨Z ,D,N , (Hi)i∈N ⟩ and a sample S = {z1, . . . zm}, we denote by ⟨Z ,S ∼ Dm,N , (Hi)i∈N ⟩ the
empirical game: the game over the sameN ,H,Z and uniform distribution over the known S ∈ Zm.
We denote the payoff of player i in the empirical game by
πSi (h) = Ez∈S [wi(z;h)] = 1
m
m∑
j=1
wi(zj ;h).
4
When S is known from the context, we occasionally use the term empirical PNE to denote a PNE of
the empirical game. Since the empirical game is a complete information game, players can use the
sample in order to optimize their payoffs.
The optimization problem of finding a best response in our model is intriguing in its own right and
deserves future study. In this paper, we assume that each player i has a polynomial ǫ-better-response
oracle. Namely, given a real number ǫ > 0, a strategy profile h and sample S, we assume that
each player i has an oracle that returns an ǫ-better response to h−i if such exists or answers false
otherwise, which runs in time poly( 1
ǫ
,m,N).2
3 Meta algorithm and analysis
Throughout this section we assume the pseudo-dimension ofHi is finite, and we denote it by di, i.e.
Pdim(Hi) = di < ∞. Our goal is to propose a generic method for finding an ǫ-PNE efficiently. The
method is composed of two steps: first, it attains a sample of “sufficient” size. Afterwards, it runs an
ǫ-better-response dynamics until convergence, and returns the obtained profile. The underlying idea
is straightforward, but its analysis is non-trivial. In particular, we need to show two main claims:
• Given a sufficiently large sample S, the payoff of each player i in the empirical game is
not too far away from her payoff in the actual game, with high probability. This holds
concurrently for all possible strategy profiles.
• An ǫ-PNE exists in every empirical game. Therefore, players can reach an ǫ-PNE of the
empirical game fast, using their ǫ-better-response oracles.
These claims will be made explicit in forthcoming Subsections 3.1 and 3.2. We formalize the above
discussion via Algorithm 1 in Subsection 3.3.
3.1 Uniform convergence in probability
We now bound the probability (over all choices of S) of having player i’s payoff (for an arbitrary
i) greater or less than its empirical counterpart by more than ǫ. Notice that the restriction of Hi
to any arbitrary sample S, i.e. Hi ∩ S, may be of infinite size. Nevertheless, the payoff function
concerns the indicator function I only and not the real-valued prediction produced by functions inHi; therefore, we now analyze this binary function class.
Let Fi ∶ Z → {0,1} such that
Fi def= {I(z, h) ∣ h ∈ Hi} . (1)
Notice that ∣Fi ∩ S ∣ represents the effective size ofHi ∩ S with respect to the indicator function I.
We already know that the pseudo-dimension ofHi is di. In Lemma 1 we bind the pseudo-dimension
ofHi with the VC dimension of Fi.
Lemma 1. VCdim(Fi) ≤ 10di.
After discovering the connection between the growth rate ofHi andFi, we can progress to bounding
the growth of the payoff function class F (which we will define shortly).
For ease of notation, denote I(z,h) = (I(z, h1), . . . ,I(z, hN)). Similarly, let w(z;h) =(w1(z;h), . . . ,wN (z;h)). Note that there is a bijection I(z,h)↦ w(z;h), which divides I(z,h)
by its norm if it is greater than zero or leaves it as is otherwise. Formally, there is a bijection M ,
M ∶ {0,1}N → {1, 1
2
, . . . , 1
N
,0}N such that for every v ∈ {0,1}N ,
M(v) = {0 if ∥v∥ = 0v
∥v∥
otherwise
.
2Notice that a best response can be found in constant time if Hi is of constant size. In addition, in the
appendix we leverage the algorithm proposed in [4], and show that it can compute a best response within the
set of linear predictors efficiently when the input dimension (denoted by n in the model above) is constant. We
also discuss situations where a better response cannot be computed efficiently in Section 5, and present the
applicability of our models for these cases as well.
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Let F = Z → {0,1}N , defined by
F def= {I (z,h) ∣ h ∈ H} .
Note that every element in F is a function from Z to {0,1}N . The restriction of F to a sample S is
defined by F ∩ S = {(I(z1,h), . . . ,I(zm,h)) ∣ h ∈ H} .
Due to the aforementioned bijection, every element in F ∩ S represents a distinct payoff vector of
the empirical game; thus, bounding ∣F ∩ S ∣ corresponds to bounding the number of distinct strategy
profiles in the empirical game. Clearly,
∣F ∩ S ∣ = N∏
i=1
∣Fi ∩ S ∣ .
The growth function of F , ΠF(m) =maxS∈Zm ∣F ∩ S ∣, is therefore bounded as follows.
Lemma 2. ΠF(m) ≤ (em)10∑Ni=1 di .
Next, we bound the probability of a player i’s payoff being “too far” from its empirical counterpart.
The proof of Lemma 3 below goes along the path of Vapnik and Chervonenkis, introduced in [20].
Since in our case F is not a binary function class, few modifications are needed.
Lemma 3. Letm be a positive integer, and let ǫ > 0. It holds that
Pr
S∼Dm
(∃h ∶ ∣πi(h) − πSi (h)∣ ≥ ǫ) ≤ 4ΠF(2m)e− ǫ2m8 .
The following Theorem 1 bounds the probability that any player i has a difference greater than ǫ
between its payoff and its empirical payoff (over the selection of a sample S), uniformly over all
possible strategy profiles. This is done by simply applying the union bound on the bound already
obtained in Lemma 3.
Theorem 1. Letm be a positive integer, and let ǫ > 0. It holds that
Pr
S∼Dm
(∃i ∈ [N] ∶ sup
h∈H
∣πi(h) − πSi (h)∣ ≥ ǫ) ≤ 4N(2em)10∑Ni=1 die− ǫ2m8 . (2)
3.2 Existence of a PNE in empirical games
In the previous subsection we bounded the probability of a payoff vector being too far from its coun-
terpart in the empirical game. Notice, however, that this result implies nothing about the existence
of a PNE or an approximate PNE: for a fixed S, even if suph∈H ∣πi(h) − πSi (h)∣ < ǫ holds for every
i, a player may still have a beneficial deviation. Therefore, the results of the previous subsection are
only meaningful if we show that there exists a PNE in the empirical game, which is the goal of this
subsection. We prove this existence using the notion of potential games [13].
A non-cooperative game is called a potential game if there exists a functionΦ ∶ H → R such that for
every strategy profile h = (h1, . . . , hN) ∈ H and every i ∈ [N], whenever player i switches from hi
to a strategy h′i ∈ Hi, the change in her payoff function equals the change in the potential function,
i.e.
Φ(h′i,h−i) −Φ(hi,h−i) = πi(h′i,h−i) − πi(hi,h−i).
Theorem 2 ([13, 17]). Every potential game with a finite strategy space possesses at least one PNE.
Obviously, in our setting the strategy space of a game instance ⟨Z ,D,N , (Hi)i∈N ⟩ is typically
infinite. Infinite potential games may also possess a PNE (as discussed in [13]), but in our case the
distribution D is approximated from samples and the empirical game is finite, so no stronger claims
are needed.
Lemma 4 below shows that every empirical game is a potential game.
Lemma 4. Every empirical game ⟨Z ,S ∼ Dm,N , (Hi)i∈N ⟩ has a potential function.
As an immediate result of Theorem 2 and Lemma 4,
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Algorithm: Approximate PNE w.h.p. via better-response dynamics
Input: δ, ǫ ∈ (0,1)
Output: a strategy profile h
1 setm =m ǫ
2
,δ // the minimal integer m satisfying Equation (3)
2 sample S from Dm
3 execute any ǫ
2
-better-response dynamics on S until convergence, and obtain a strategy profile h
that is an empirical ǫ
2
-PNE
4 return h
Corollary 1. Every empirical game ⟨Z ,S ∼ Dm,N , (Hi)i∈N ⟩ possesses at least one PNE.
After establishing the existence of a PNE in the empirical game, we are interested in the rate with
which it can be “learnt”. More formally, we are interested in the convergence rate of the dynamics
between the players, where at every step one player deviates to one of her ǫ-better responses. Such
dynamics do not necessarily converge in general games, but do converge in potential games. By
examining the specific potential function in our class of (empirical) games, we can also bound the
number of steps until convergence.
Lemma 5. Let ⟨Z ,S ∼ Dm,N , (Hi)i∈N ⟩ be any empirical game instance. After at most O ( logNǫ )
iterations of any ǫ-better-response dynamics, an ǫ-PNE is obtained.
3.3 Learning ǫ-PNE with high probability
In this subsection we leverage the results of the previous Subsections 3.1 and 3.2 to devise Algorithm
1, which runs in polynomial time and returns an approximate equilibrium with high probability.
More precisely, we show that Algorithm 1 returns an ǫ-PNE with probability of at least 1 − δ, and
has time complexity of poly(1
ǫ
,m,N, log (1
δ
) , d). As in the previous subsections, we denote d =
∑Ni=1 di.
First, we bound the required sample size. Using standard algebraic manipulations on Equation (2),
we obtain the following.
Lemma 6. Let ǫ, δ ∈ (0,1), and let
m ≥ 320d
ǫ2
log(160d
ǫ2
) + 160d log(2e)
ǫ2
+ 16
ǫ2
log (4N
δ
) . (3)
With probability of at least 1 − δ over all possible samples S of sizem, it holds that
∀i ∈ [N] ∶ sup
h∈H
∣πi(h) − πSi (h)∣ < ǫ.
Given ǫ, δ, we denote bymǫ,δ the minimal integerm satisfying Equation (3). Lemma 6 shows that
mǫ,δ = O ( dǫ2 log ( dǫ2 ) + 1ǫ2 log (Nδ )) are enough samples to have all empirical payoff vectors ǫ-close
to their theoretic counterpart coordinate-wise (i.e. L∞ norm), with a probability of at least 1 − δ.
Next, we bind an approximate PNE in the empirical game with an approximate PNE in the (actual)
game.
Lemma 7. Letm ≥m ǫ
4
,δ and let h be an
ǫ
2
-PNE in ⟨Z ,S ∼ Dm,N , (Hi)i∈N ⟩. Then h is an ǫ-PNE
with probability of at least 1 − δ.
Recall that Lemma 5 ensures that everyO ( logN
ǫ
) iterations of any ǫ-better-response dynamics must
converge to an ǫ-PNE of the empirical game. In each such iteration a player calls her approximate
better-response oracle, which is assumed to run in poly( 1
ǫ
,m,N) time. Altogether, given ǫ and δ,
Algorithm 1 runs in poly( 1
ǫ
,N, log ( 1
δ
) , d) time, and returns an ǫ-PNE with probability of at least
1 − δ.
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4 Learnability in games with infinite dimension
While Lemma 1 upper bounds VCdim(Fi) as a function of Pdim(Hi), it is fairly easy to show that
VCdim(Fi) ≥ Pdim(Hi) (we prove this claim formally in the appendix). Therefore, if Pdim(Hi) is
infinite, so is VCdim(Fi).
Classical results in learning theory suggest that if Pdim(Fi) = ∞, a best response on the sample
may not generalize to an approximate best response w.h.p. To see this, imagine a “game” with one
player, who seeks to maximize her payoff function. No Free Lunch Theorems (see, e.g., [21]) imply
that with a constant probability the player cannot get her payoff within a constant distance from the
optimal payoff. We conclude that in general games, if a player has a strategy space with an infinite
pseudo-dimension, she may not be able to learn. However, in the presence of such a player, can
other players with a finite pseudo-dimension learn an approximate best-response?
One typically shows non-learnability by constructing two distributions and proving that with con-
stant probability an agent cannot tell which distribution produced the sample she obtained. These
two distributions are constructed to be distant enough from each other, so the loss (or payoff in our
setting) is far from optimal by at least a constant. In our setting, however, players are interacting
with each other, and player payoffs are a function of the whole strategy profile; thus, interesting
phenomena occur even if the distribution D is known. In particular, Example 1 below demonstrates
that in the infinite dimension case, not every empirical PNE is generalized to an approximate PNE
with high probability.
Example 1. Let D be a density function over Z = [0,2] × {0,1} × { 1
2
} as follows:
D(x, y, t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
2
0 ≤ x < 1, y = 0, t = 1
2
1
2
1 ≤ x ≤ 2, y = 1, t = 1
2
0 otherwise
.
In addition, for any finite size subset S of Z in the support of D, denote
hS→0(x) = {0 ∃y, t ∶ (x, y, t) ∈ S
11≤x≤2 ∀y, t ∶ (x, y, t) ∉ S , hS→1(x) = {
1 ∃y, t ∶ (x, y, t) ∈ S
11≤x≤2 ∀y, t ∶ (x, y, t) ∉ S .
In other words, hS→0 labels 0 every instance that appears in the sample S and every instance in the[0,1) segment. On the other hand, hS→1 labels 1 every instance that appears in the sample S and
every instance in the [1,2] segment. Denote
H1 = {hS→0 ∣ S ⊂ Z} ∪ {hS→1 ∣ S ⊂ Z},
and letH2 = H3 = {10≤x<1,11≤x≤2}. In this three-player game, consider the profileh = (h1, h2, h3)
such that h1 = hS→0, h2 = h3 = 11≤x≤2. Notice that the payoffs under h are defined as follows:
π1(h) = 1
m
m∑
j=1
(1 − yj), π2(h) = π2(h) = 1
2m
m∑
j=1
yj .
Observe that if 1
2
< 1
m ∑mj=1 yj < 34 , then h is an empirical PNE, since no player can improve her
payoff. Notice, however, that π3(h) = 16 yet π3(10≤x<1,h−2) = 14 .
Since we have 1
2
< 1
m ∑mj=1 yj < 34 with probability of at least 14 over all choices of S for ∣S ∣ ≥ 15
(see the appendix), this empirical equilibrium will not be generalized to 1
12
-PNE w.p. of at least 1
4
.
This is true for any ǫ, δ ∈ (0,1); thus, an empirical PNE is not generalized to an approximate PNE
w.h.p.
Another interesting point is that in Example 1 each player can trivially find a strategy that maximizes
her payoff if she were alone, since D is known. Indeed, this inability to generalize from samples
follows solely from strategic behavior. Notice that if player 3 has knowledge of H1, she can infer
that her strategy under h is sub-optimal. However, knowledge of the strategy spaces of other players
is a heavy assumption: the better-response dynamics we discussed in Subsection 3.2 only assumed
that each player can compute a better response.
8
5 Discussion
As mentioned in Section 2.1, our analysis assumes players have better-response oracles. In fact,
our model and results are valid for a much more general scenario, as described next. Consider the
case where players only have heuristics for finding a better response. After running heuristic better-
response dynamics and obtaining a strategy profile, the payoffs with respect to the whole population
are guaranteed to be close to their empirical counterparts, w.h.p.; therefore, our analysis is still
meaningful even if players cannot maximize their empirical payoff efficiently, as the bounds on the
required sample size we obtained in Section 3 and the rate of convergence are relevant for this case
as well.
The reader may wonder about a variation of our model, where player payoffs are defined differently.
For example, consider each user as granting one monetary unit to the player that offers the closest
prediction to his instance. This definition is in the spirit of Dueling Algorithms [10] and Best Re-
sponse Regression [4]. Under this payoff function, and unlike our model, an empirical PNE does
not necessarily exist. Nevertheless, we believe that examining and understanding these scenarios is
fundamental to analysis of competing prediction algorithms, and deserves future work.
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